Unfortunately, the deceased passed away in November 2007 before the balance could be paid. The respondent was appointed executor of his estate and he acknowledged liability for payment of the balance of the purchase price but denied liability for interest. As a result, the appellant instituted action in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court for payment of the balance of the purchase price plus interest at the prescribed rate of 15.5% per annum.
The respondent argued that the deceased was not at fault in failing to pay the balance due to his untimely demise and therefore was not in mora and could not be liable for mora interest. Secondly, the respondent argued that the passing away of the deceased rendered performance impossible.
Judgment
The KwaZulu-Natal High Court granted judgment for the capital sum, but dismissed the claim for interest. The court held that to be in mora, failure to perform had to be due to fault on the part of the debtor. Since the deceased had no fault in the failure to perform, there could be no mora and consequently no mora interest.
The court rejected the second argument and indicated that unless the contract expressly stipulated otherwise or the transaction involved a delectus personae, the death of a debtor did not amount to impossibility as the duty devolved on the estate of the deceased.
The matter then went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal to determine if the estate was liable to pay interest on the balance of the purchase price. In a unanimous judgment, Pillay AJA indicated that mora interest is a form of contractual damages and does not depend on fault. To claim mora interest, a creditor must only prove that a debtor is in mora in the sense that payment was not made at the specified time. It is not necessary to prove any fault on the part of the debtor. 
Discussion
This judgment seems to fly in the face of conventional wisdom. LAWSA 4 explains that [m] ora debitoris is culpable failure on the part of a debtor to perform timeously in a case where performance still remains possible in spite of such failure.
Literature on the law of contract in South Africa have over the years tended to hold that fault is indeed an element of mora debitoris. 5 In one of the first textbooks on the law of contract in South Africa, Wessels 6 explains that [b] efore there can be mora (1) there must be a valid and enforceable claim; (2) the debtor must have failed to perform at the time when he should have done so; and (3) the failure or delay must have been due to the culpa of the debtor ... and adds 7 that "before the delay amounts to mora, it must be culpable". Joubert 8 also argues that [t] he default must be due to the fault (culpa) of the debtor. The law readily accepts that there can be no mora debitoris when the default of the debtor is due to the fault of the creditor. Irrespective of whether the creditor is in mora creditors or not, the debtor is also excused because there is no fault on his part. We can therefore conclude that fault is indeed a requirement for mora debitoris. ...
[P]ractice does not require the creditor to plead fault on the part of the debtor, nor to advance proof of fault specifically, this is so because mere delay leads to the inference of fault. The debtor should be allowed to put any absence of fault on his part in issue. He will be excused if there is no fault unless he undertook the risk of the particular cause which delayed performance upon himself ...
De Wet and Van Wyk 9 echoe this view and state that the delay must be due to fault on the part of the debtor or someone for whose conduct the debtor is liable. Van
Jaarsveld et al 10 agree and mention that while fault is an element of mora debitoris, the creditor does not have to prove that the delay is due to the fault of the debtor.
However, the debtor may raise absence of fault as a defence against a claim based on mora debitoris.
Zimmermann and Visser
11 explain that mora debitoris is defined as culpable delay on the part of the debtor in performing an obligation that is due and enforceable, and that remains capable of performance in spite of such delay.
Zimmermann, Visser and Reid 12 also note that in respect of many, if not most forms of breach the absence of fault on the part of the alleged contract-breaker will usually afford a good defence.
In a footnote, they add that
[t]his seems to be so in regard to both forms of mora, to prevention of performance and, to a large extent, also to positive malperformance; the position in respect of repudiation is more complex.
Hutchinson and Pretorius 13 define mora debitoris as the culpable failure of the debtor to make timeous performance of a positive obligation that is due and enforceable and still capable of performance in spite of such failure.
They add 14 that
[t]he delay must be due to the fault of the debtor or of persons for whom he or she is responsible. … The onus is apparently on the debtor to show that the delay was not due to his or her fault. Buckland 47 indicates that failure to discharge a legal obligation had to be wilful to constitute mora and cites a passage of Pomponius 48 in this regard. In the passage, Pomponius indicates that a debtor who is prevented from delivering performance when the object of performance is lost due to some wilful act by the debtor shall bear the loss. 49 This is clearly a reference to another form of breach -rendering performance impossible -and not to mora debitoris, so that Buckland's conclusion with regard to fault as an element of mora debitoris in Roman law is invalid.
50
Interestingly, Kaser 51 explains that in the case of mora creditoris the failure of performance had to be due to the creditor's conduct ...; but he was in default, even if he was innocently unable to accept performance or to collect the object of the performance.
Since both mora debitoris and mora creditoris relate to delay of performance and both constitute negative malperformance, it would have been strange indeed if the creditor was held to adhere strictly to the contract, while the debtor was liable only for intentional breach. None of them noted any further requirements, such as fault on the part of the debtor, that had to be satisfied before a debtor would be in mora and therefore liable for mora interest.
58
In fact, there is some indication that fault was not an element of mora debitoris in Roman law. Proculus 59 explained that where it was stipulated that a penalty would apply if the debtor did not perform by a specified date, the debtor who failed to perform by that date would be in mora and therefore liable for payment of the penalty, even if it was clear that the work could not be completed on time and even if the stipulator allowed an extension of the time for performance. The mere fact that the debtor failed to perform by the stipulated date constituted mora.
Ulpian 60 warned, though, that not every delay in performance amounted to mora.
Where a debtor required some friends or his sureties to be present at the time when the debt was paid, the debtor was not in mora if payment was postponed as a result.
The presence of the friends or sureties was probably required to witness the payment and may have fulfilled a function similar to the function of a receipt in modern commerce. 61 If the debtor intended to raise some lawful exception, any delay occasioned similarly did not amount to mora. 62 If the creditor caused the delay the debtor was not liable for being in mora. 63 Pomponius 64 suggested that mora occurred only if the debtor was not prevented by hardship from delivering that which he had always been able to deliver. Ulpian 65 shared this view and indicated that a debtor who was suddenly compelled to be absent on public business was not held to be in mora. The same applied where the debtor was held captive by the enemy.
66
Scaevola 67 added that a debtor was not in mora where the creditor waived his claim.
Papinianus 68 also referred to the case where there was no-one to whom the money could be paid after the death of the creditor, so that the debtor was not in mora during that time. In the case of at least some of the excuses dealt with by the various
Roman jurists, such as the raising of an exception or the calling of witnesses or sureties, the debtor would intentionally delay performance. As a result, these excuses cannot be said to exclude fault, but rather seem to amount to grounds of justification that would exclude the wrongfulness of the delay.
What becomes apparent if one reads through the various Roman texts dealing with mora debitoris is that none of the Roman jurists explicitly mentioned fault as an element of mora, 69 but there is some indication that fault was not required.
70
Because of this it can be concluded that mora in Roman law was not a culpable default in delivering performance, but rather a wrongful default. As was the case under Roman law, it seems that Roman-Dutch law also viewed mora as a wrongful default rather than a culpable default, so that fault was not an element of mora.
At the same time the English Common law of contract was also developing its own rules relating to breach of contract and default in performance. In Paradine v Jane when a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.
As a result, the defendant remained liable for the rent.
This principle of absolute liability was observed by English courts until the second half of the nineteenth century when the doctrine of impossibility was introduced. In The various historical sources of the various legal systems which shaped our modern South African law, and in particular the law of contract and our law relating to breach of contract, therefore do not lend support to the contention that fault is an element of mora debitoris.
Taylor v Caldwell

Comparative analysis
If there is no solid historical foundation for the contention that fault is an element of mora debitoris, how did the authors of the various textbooks on the law of contract in South Africa come to include it in their respective works? Perhaps the principle was derived from a similar rule in some foreign law relating to breach of contract? Some guidance can then be provided by considering the laws relating to breach of contract in other jurisdictions, which could have influenced our modern law relating to mora debitoris.
Scots law in respect of negative malperformance is essentially based on Roman law
and a debtor is in mora if the debtor wrongfully withholds performance. 86 In 87 Lord Drummond Young explained 88 that if a party to a contract is unable to perform his obligations, the reason for that failure is irrelevant. In particular, it is immaterial that he is unable to perform because he cannot obtain requisite funds ... Thus if a party who has undertaken to sell an area of land is unable to obtain the land, the reason for the inability is irrelevant; there is still an inability to comply with the ultimatum notice. This can be regarded as an example of the fundamental principle that contractual obligations normally involve strict liability.
Persimmon Homes Ltd v Bellway Homes Ltd
In Scots law, interest on a contractual debt generally begins to run only once a judicial demand is made, and interest is calculated from the date of citation to the date of payment. Although the English law of contract and breach of contract is not derived from Roman law, contractual obligations in English law also generally impose a strict duty on the debtor to perform. 90 This, in turn, means that breach of contract is based on strict liability and fault is not an element of breach of contract in English law.
91
A further implication of this principle of strict liability is that a claim for damages arising from breach of contract cannot at common law be apportioned on the basis of contributory negligence. Since fault is not an element of breach, contributory fault is irrelevant.
92
The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts in the United States provides in §235 (2) that any non-performance, when performance under a contract is due, is a breach. 93 The Restatement contains no provision which would suggest that fault is an element of breach. But if there is an uncured material failure by the other party to render performance which was due at an earlier time, the debtor may be excused for withholding performance. 94 The parties will be released from performance in the event of supervening impracticability where subsequent events, without the fault of the debtor, render the performance impracticable. 95 The same applies where supervening events frustrate the purpose of the contract, unless the parties agreed otherwise.
96
Article 6:81 of the new Dutch Burgelijk Wetboek provides that the debtor is in default during the time that performance remains undelivered after it has become due, unless the delay is not attributable to the debtor. Delay in performance is not 286(1) of the BGB, the party who relies on the exception must prove that exception.
The burden of proof is therefore reversed and the debtor bears the onus to prove absence of fault -it is not necessary for the creditor to prove fault on the part of the defaulting debtor. 107 In addition, article 323 of the BGB provides that, in the case of a reciprocal contract, a creditor may rescind the contract if the debtor does not perform in accordance with the contract and fails to perform after an additional period for performance has been specified. Article 323(6) excludes rescission only if the creditor is solely or predominantly responsible for the circumstances which would allow for rescission, or if the circumstance for which the debtor is not responsible occurs at a time when the creditor has defaulted in acceptance of the performance.
The implication, as Lorenz 108 explains, is that "fault is no prerequisite for terminating a contract if the debtor fails to comply with a duty incumbent upon him under the contract". 109 As a result, the German approach is not a strictly fault-based approach and lies halfway between fault liability and strict liability.
110
Clearly then, it is highly unlikely that the view in terms of which, in the South African law of contract, mora debitoris is the culpable delay of performance by the debtor, is derived from any other major legal system.
South African law
In view of the historical development and comparative analysis set out above, I now return to the various textbooks on the South African law of contract that identify fault as an element of mora debitoris. LAWSA 111 does not refer to any authority to substantiate the view that fault is an element of mora debitoris, and that impairs its credibility in this regard. Another excusatio would be supervening impossibility. 119 In other words, Steyn 120 thinks of culpa not in the strict sense of "negligence" but rather in the broader sense of "blameworthiness". As a result, reliance on Steyn 121 for the proposition that fault is rather than a mere delay, so that any discussion of mora debitoris is merely obiter.
Secondly, the defendant in effect sought to raise the exceptio non adimpleti contractus by submitting that his duty to deliver the merx was subject to the prior payment of certain charges by the plaintiff. 146 As such, the use of the expression "culpable delay" may have been misplaced, as the question was not the fault of the defendant but the lawfulness of his refusal to perform.
There seem to be no clear precedents in South Africa which postulate fault as an element of mora debitoris, but there is a whole range of cases in which the courts address mora debitoris without referring to culpability or fault. 
